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ABSTRACT 
 
The Coca-Cola Company is the undisputed global leader in the cola industry.  Despite its size and 
marketing savvy, the company has faced a barrage of competition from new companies in the 
Middle East and some parts of Europe.  These companies have tried to create a niche for 
themselves by tapping into the anti-U.S. sentiment that prevails among a section of population in 
these markets.  We review three such competitors, Zam Zam Cola, Mecca Cola, and Qibla Cola 
and their strategies for challenging the global giant. 
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THE COCA-COLA COMPANY 
 
ith sales and operations in over 200 countries, The Coca-Cola Company is the worlds’ largest 
producer and marketer of nonalcoholic beverage concentrates in the world.  While Coca-Cola 
beverages have been sold in the United States since 1886, the company has made significant 
advances in its global reach and dominance in the last few decades.  Of the roughly 50 billion beverage servings 
consumed worldwide on any given day. The Coca-Cola Company serves 1.3 billion of those servings.  In terms of 
worldwide sales of nonalcoholic beverages, the company claimed a 10% market share in 2004, while employing 
approximately 50,000 people.  As of 2004, the company divided its global operations into six segments or 
“operating groups”: 
 
• North America 
• Africa 
• Asia  
• Europe, Eurasia and Middle East 
• Latin America 
• Corporate 
 
The relative size and contributions of these segments are given in Table 1. 
 
The Coca-Cola Company recognizes a number of factors that could create challenges and risks for the 
company.  Specifically, it identifies people’s obesity concerns, water quality and availability issues, changing 
consumer preferences, and increasing competition as potential threats.   
 
In the Middle Eastern market, an important element that contributes to changing consumer preferences and 
increased competition is the political environment in which the company operates.  Since 2000, the turmoil in the 
Middle East – the second Palestinian Intifada and the second Gulf War – has created an anti-American sentiment 
that has not only given rise to new competitors in the Middle East, but has also fueled consumer resentment against 
American brands.  Both established companies and entrepreneurs have taken advantage of the anti-American climate 
in the Middle East and even Europe to market products that taste and look like the “real thing”. 
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Table 1: The Coco-Cola Company Performance Overview: 2004 ($ million) 
 
North 
America Africa Asia 
Europe, 
Eurasia and 
Middle East 
Latin 
America Corporate Consolidated 
Net Operating Revenue        
2004 $6,643 $1,067 $4,691 $7,195 $2,123 $243 $21,962 
2003 6,344 827 5,052 6,556 2,042 223 21,044 
2002 6,264 684 5,054 5,262 2,089 211 19,564 
Operating income         
2004 $1,606 $340 $1,758 $1,898 $1,069 ($973) $5,698 
2003 1,282 249 1,690 1,908 970 -878 5,221 
2002 1,531 224 1,820 1,612 1,033 -762 5,458 
Income before taxes        
2004 $1,629 $337 $1,841 $1,916 $1,270 ($771) $6,222 
2003 1,326 249 1,740 1,921 975 -716 5,495 
2002 1,552 187 1,848 1,540 1,081 -709 5,499 
Source: The Coca-Cola Company Annual Report 2004 
 
 
The five geographic segments are quite different in their market structures as well as consumption habits.  
The Coca-Cola Company reports the following information pertaining to these segments (Table 2): 
 
 
Table 2: Market Characteristics of the Segments 
  Population 
Company Employees 
(Includes Corporate) Brands Sold 
Annual Per Capita 
Consumption of Company 
Products 
North America 333 million 11,700 93 411 servings 
Africa 869 million 8,400 86 35 servings 
Asia 3.3 billion 9,400 184 26 servings 
Europe, Eurasia, 
and Middle East 1.2 billion 16,200 129 82 servings 
Latin America 547 million 4,700 105 214 servings 
Source: The Coca-Cola Company Annual Report 2004 
 
 
The trend can be traced back to late 2000 when the then Israeli opposition leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the 
religious compound in Jerusalem to assert that the site would remain under Israeli sovereignty if his party won the 
election. The compound is the holiest site in Judaism (Temple Mount) and the third holiest site in Islam (Al-Aqsa 
Mosque). Although Sharon did not actually go into Al-Aqsa Mosque, the visit ignited the second Palestinian 
uprising, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Violence, riots, and unrest erupted in Jerusalem, and almost instantly 
spread to other Palestinian territories. Throughout the Middle East, people were manifesting an unprecedented 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause through gigantic demonstrations chanting anti-Israeli and anti-American 
slogans. American MNCs were caught in the backlash as street anger turned into calls to boycott American brands, 
including McDonald's, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, KFC, Pizza Hut, Marlboro, Proctor & Gamble, and Starbucks.  
Capitalizing on the boycott campaign, a range of "Muslim-friendly" drinks was launched as part of a backlash 
against U.S. brands such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Three such brands, Zam Zam Cola, Mecca-Cola, and Qibla Cola, 
managed to ride the anti-American sentiments and boost their sales. Though they had different histories - Mecca and 
Qibla were founded in Europe in 2002 and 2003 respectively by Muslim entrepreneurs, while Zam Zam is a product 
of the Iranian Revolution - their strategies were similar. Each brand attempted to get the most out of the anti-
American sentiment among Muslim consumers.   Table 3 provides a break-up of Coca-Cola’s 2004 unit case volume 
for the segment “Europe, Eurasia, and Middle East.” 
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Table 3: Europe, Eurasia, & Middle East: 2004 Unit Case Volume 
Country/Region Share 
Germany 14% 
Eurasia and Middle East 12% 
UK 12% 
Spain 12% 
Central Europe and Russia 11% 
France 7% 
Italy 6% 
Belgium 3% 
Netherland 3% 
Other 20% 
Source: The Coca-Cola Company Annual Report 2004 
 
 
ZAM ZAM COLA 
 
Zam Zam Cola, named after the Well of Zamzam in Mecca that Muslims consider sacred, was founded in 
1954 as the Iranian partner of Pepsi until their contract was terminated after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Zam 
Zam's 17 plants bottled Pepsi between 1954 and 1979, when American companies’ assets were confiscated in the 
aftermath of the Ayatollah coup. Since then, the company has been controlled by the Foundation of the Dispossessed, 
a powerful state charity run by clerics. For nearly half a century, Zam Zam's main market remained the home market 
of Iran.  
 
Zam Zam Cola has long been a local player with its 65 products distributed throughout Iran (Zam Zam 
Group Web site). The turning point was the turmoil in the Palestinian territories which reached its peak in spring 
2002. Consumers in the Muslim world stepped up boycotts of American products to protest support of Israel in the 
ongoing Middle East conflict. As a result, Zam Zam Cola was bombarded by substantial orders from neighboring 
Arab countries. The company took advantage of the opportunity, and Iranian factories worked round the clock to 
pick up the slack. Within four months, the company captured a sizable Middle Eastern market, and exported 
millions of cans to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Arabic News 2002). "The campaign of boycotting American 
products and the good quality of Zamzam Cola have given us excellent sales," general manager Firas Khawaja told 
Reuters news agency (BBC News 2002). In fact, the company didn’t really venture overseas and register its 
trademark with the World Intellectual Property Organization until December 2002 (World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2002). 
 
By the end of 2002, Saudi Arabia unofficially named Zam Zam the "Hajj drink". Ten million bottles of 
Zam Zam were exported to Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries during the pilgrimage season to Mecca. “After Arab 
countries in the region started boycotting some American goods, including Coca-Cola, demand for Zam Zam really 
took off,” Bahram Kheiry, Zam Zam’s marketing manager said in October 2002 (Theodoulou, et al 2002).  Zam 
Zam’s cola was exported to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. After capturing a sizeable share in the Middle Eastern market, Zam Zam turned to Europe, 
and Denmark was its first stop (Copenhagen Post Online 2002).  
 
By early 2003, U.S. companies in the Middle East were hoping to recover from the two plus year boycott 
campaign. However, the war in Iraq did not help. Operation Iraqi Freedom gave consumers in the Middle East one 
more reason to continue boycotting American MNCs. Just as the boycott campaign, initially inspired by the 
Palestinian intifada was starting to loose steam, the war in Iraq gave it energy and force. Many Arabs were furious 
over Iraqi civilian casualties, the excessive force used in bombarding Baghdad, and mistrust over the actual reasons 
for the invasion (Gulf News 2003). 
 
This renewed interest in the boycott was good news for Zam Zam which announced plans to upgrade and 
expand production plants in Iran to meet the growing demand for its drinks.  The company also announced the 
setting up of additional bottling facilities in neighboring Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Dubai (Middle East Times 
2002). In July 2003, Zam Zam was in the process of establishing a factory in Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates to 
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avoid tariffs and reduce transport costs. The six Gulf Arab countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman constitute a free trade area (Arabic News 2002).  
 
However, in a sudden and unexpected move, the authorities in Saudi Arabia banned Zam Zam imports as 
there were objections over its brand name (AME Info 2003). The local distributor, Al-Majarra Company, was in 
disbelief. “We have not received any official communiqué from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry or from 
Saudi customs about the issue,” a company spokesman told Arab News (Haider & Al-Harbi 2003). The ban came as 
a relief to Coke and Pepsi after an 18-month boycott. “Things have improved for Coca-Cola and Pepsi and people 
are gradually returning to them. The boycott is dying down ……. Zamzam Cola is the only drink which had the 
potential to make a dent into the market of these two American soft drink companies. Its name was the biggest 
attraction,” a major supermarket chain staff said in an interview (Haider 2003). 
 
MECCA COLA 
 
Capitalizing on the same anti-American sentiment, Tawfiq Mathlouthi, a French Muslim entrepreneur who 
emigrated from his native Tunisia in 1977, launched Mecca-Cola in Paris in November 2002. It all began when Mr. 
Mathlouthi asked his ten-year old son to give up drinking Coke because of its American origin. His son agreed, but 
only if Mr. Mathlouthi could provide an alternative. “That's how the idea was born,'' Mathlouthi said in an interview 
(Tagliabue 2002).   
 
His objective was to cater to European Arabs and Muslims who boycotted the U.S. beverages. He argued 
that his product would give consumers a soft drink choice that did not implicitly offer support to American policies 
in the region. Mr. Mathlouthi even promised that 10% of the profits would go to a Palestinian children’s charity and 
another 10% to support charitable associations in the country where product was sold . The launch was relatively 
successful and Mecca sold more than 2 million of its 1.5-litre bottles in France within two months, each one 
described by the company's founder as "a little gesture against US imperialism and foreign policy". Mr. Mathlouthi 
also added that "demand has been phenomenal" (Henley & Vasagar 2003).  
 
Mathlouthi, a lawyer and journalist who ran a radio station for France's Muslim minority, has been known 
for his strong opposition to the American and Israeli policies. He has publicly issued declarations against 
"Imperialism and Zionism" from time to time. It is all about combating "America's imperialism and Zionism by 
providing a substitute for American goods and increasing the blockade of countries boycotting American goods," Mr. 
Mathlouthi told BBC News Online (Murphy 2003). In another statement, he explained: "People are thirsty for a way 
to stand up to American hypocrisy …. Mecca Cola is not just a drink …… It is an act of protest against Bush and 
Rumsfeld and their policies" (Delves 2003). The prominently visible slogan, "Ne buvez plus idiot, buvez engagé" or 
“Don't drink stupid, drink with commitment” clearly explained the attitude of the company. The product label may 
look like Coca-Cola's, but the message was undoubtedly controversial and probably provocative. The brand name 
itself referred to Mecca, the holiest city of Islam located in Saudi Arabia. The label also mentions: "Please do not 
mix with alcohol." 
 
Coca-Cola dismissed Mr. Mathlouthi's move, saying he had "identified a commercial opportunity which 
involves the exploitation in Europe of the difficult and complex situation in the Middle East ……… Ultimately it is 
the consumer who will make the decision," the company said in a statement (Murphy 2003). 
 
The consumer made “the decision” and Coke’s sales dropped, forcing Coca- Cola executives to distance 
themselves from U.S. Middle East policy. A spokesman said: “We are a business, so we do not get involved in 
political issues” (Theodoulou, et al 2002). Nevertheless, in December 2002, Coke acknowledged that the Arab 
boycott had wounded the company. The president of Coca-Cola Africa, Alexander B. Cummings Jr., told analysts 
that ''our business in these countries has been hurt by the boycotting of American brands.'' Another Coke executive, 
asked about Mecca-Cola, replied briefly, ''We are aware of Mecca, and we have felt the impact of the boycott of 
American goods'' (Tagliabue 2002). 
 
Mathlouthi's Mecca Cola has been a huge success since the start of sales in early November 2002. From his 
warehouse in Paris he shipped out over a million bottles per week to local supermarkets and grocery stores. He 
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didn’t spend on advertising, but rather relied on word of mouth, creating a buzz, and featuring Palestinian children 
fighting Israeli soldiers on the company’s Web site. Mathlouthi's marketing strategy was that real-life footage of the 
Intifada would be more effective and obviously less expensive than hiring celebrities to endorse his product. 
Palestinian donations were a major selling point as well (Kovach 2002).  
 
Meanwhile, Mathlouthi admitted that an imminent war in the Middle East would soar his sales. “The 
biggest boost for Mecca-Cola would be war in Iraq. If there's a war, you'd have an extraordinary flare-up of Mecca-
Cola'' (Theodoulou, et al 2002).  Mathlouthi was right. Sales surged as other supporters joined forces after the U.S. 
war in Iraq. Orders from Arab and European countries started to pour in on the company, together with bids from 
companies wanting to become local distributors. Riding on anti-American anger over issues like Palestine, Iraq, Iran 
and Afghanistan, Mecca Cola achieved impressive sales in a very short period of time. For example, in January 2003, 
Mecca opened its UK base in Birmingham and sold 300,000 liters in two weeks (Grimston 2003). In May 2003, 
Mecca was introduced in Yemen and was distributed through a sole agent (Yemen Times 2003a). Mr. Mathlouthi 
held a press conference in Sana’a, Yemen, in December 2003 and announced that the company would build a 
factory for Mecca-Cola in Sana’a by mid 2004 (Yemen Times 2003b). 
 
In August 2003, Mecca moved its headquarters to Dubai and announced plans to invest Dh35 million 
(approximately $10 million) in a facility in Jebel Ali Free Zone to produce the new “Muslim” alternative to the 
existing colas in the market. The new plant was expected to manufacture almost 400,000 cans per day, and was 
expected to be operational by the end of 2004 (Qadir 2003). In June 2004, Mecca Cola went on sale in parts of Israel 
for the first time. Bottles featuring illustrations of Jerusalem's landmark Dome of the Rock lined the shelves in Arab 
Israeli towns and markets. "Drink from commitment, taste the flavor of freedom," was written in Arabic on the 
bottle. Mr. Mathlouthi said that he wanted to "struggle against Zionism inside its home" (Ettinger 2004). He also 
added that he got the idea to launch Mecca during Israel's siege of the Palestinian city of Jenin during the second 
Intifada. 
 
In late 2004, in order to win back customers, Coca-Cola aired a stunning commercial across the Middle 
East featuring Arab pop star Nancy Ajram. According to Coke’s regional manager, the pricey ad had an “immediate 
impact across the Arab region” (Los Angeles Times 2008).  
 
QIBLA COLA 
 
Qibla was launched in the British market in February 2003, following the initial success of Mathlouthi's 
Mecca brand in France, targeting the 2.5 million Muslim community in the U.K. The two founders of the company 
were cousins, Zahida Parveen and Zafer Iqbal. Like its counterpart, it used a religious tag and a catchy slogan. Qibla 
is an Islamic term which means the direction in which all Muslims turn their faces in prayers and that direction is 
towards the Ka'abah (a square stone building in the Sacred Mosque) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. "Liberate Your Taste" 
declared Qibla Cola’s slogan. The company announced that ten percent of profits from every two-liter bottle sold 
would go to the Muslim charity Islamic Aid, which specializes in establishing humanitarian projects in some of the 
world's most deprived communities. The company admitted its directors had no experience in the soft drink market, 
yet they saw an opportunity. By offering a dose of activism along with the usual sugar, preservatives and carbonated 
water, Parveen and Iqbal were utilizing the same strategy Zam Zam and Mecca adopted: cashing in on anti-
American sentiment (BBC News 2003).  
 
Ms. Parveen said she designed the drink to provide an ethical alternative for Muslims. She said in an 
interview that Qibla Cola was asking consumers to liberate their taste buds from the multibillion dollar marketing 
machines. "By choosing to boycott major brands, consumers are sending a powerful signal: that the exploitation of 
Muslims cannot continue unchecked" (CBC News 2003). "Muslims are increasingly questioning the role some major 
multinationals play in our societies. They ask, should the money of the oppressed go to the oppressors?" she 
explained in another interview (Jeffery 2003). 
 
Qibla had a relatively good start and sold millions of units in the first few months by securing independent 
local retailers and restaurants. They also had ambitious and quick plans to take the brand global. In November 2003, 
Qibla products were introduced in the Norwegian market (The Qibla Cola Company 2003 ). In January 2004, Qibla 
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signed an agreement with a distributor in Bangladesh to bottle locally and distribute products of the Qibla Cola 
Company. Commenting on the contract, Mohammed Haider, Chief Business Development Officer said, “The appeal 
for Qibla Cola is gaining global momentum. Consumers appreciate the way Qibla Cola tastes and looks whilst 
knowing that their money will contribute to worthy causes,” (The Qibla Cola Company 2004a).  In March 2004, 
Qibla signed an agreement with Mighty Beverages Ltd of Pakistan to exclusively bottle and distribute products of 
the Qibla Cola Company in Pakistan (The Qibla Cola Company 2004b). In September 2004, Qibla announced on its 
Web site that the company was distributing its products in Canada, Netherlands, Norway and Pakistan with 
Australia, Libya and Malaysia to follow soon (The Qibla Cola Company 2004c).  
 
Regardless of this apparent progress and expansion, the company struggled to keep up its momentum. In 
July 2004, charity Islamic Aid cancelled its agreement with Qibla Cola because it had not yet received any money. 
When Qibla Cola was established in 2003, it marketed itself on the selling point that 10% of profits would go to 
charity. Qibla responded to the agreement cancellation by renewing its promise to donate to charity once it started 
making profits (BBC News 2004).  
 
As the year 2004 came to a close, The Coca Cola Company faced several challenges in the Middle Eastern 
as well as some European markets.  It wasn’t so much the Company’s products or promotional acumen that was 
being challenged.  The so-called “Muslim Colas” were redefining the battle at an ideological level.  This case 
illustrates many of the challenges faced by MNC’s when brands become ideological symbols.   
 
Case Questions: 
 
1. What strategic alternatives are open to The Coca-Cola Company in combating Zam Zam, Mecca and 
Qibla?  Which one would you recommend and why? 
2. Was it a good business decision for The Coca-Cola Company to distance itself from U.S. Middle East 
policy?  Why? Why not? 
3. What are the risks faced by Zam Zam?  Mecca?  Qibla? What could be the consequences of the risks you 
have identified? 
4. In your view, are there any ethical or moral problems associated with basing a brand on ideology? Why? 
Why not? 
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